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Abstract 1 
Our ability to make sense of information on the potential intentions and dispositions of others is of 2 
paramount importance for understanding their communicative intent, and for judging what an 3 
appropriate reaction might be. Thus anything that impinges on this ability has the potential to cause 4 
significant social impairment, and compromise an individual’s level of functioning. Both bipolar 5 
disorder and schizophrenia are known to feature theory of mind impairment. We conducted a 6 
theoretical review to determine the extent and types of theory of mind impairment in bipolar 7 
disorder, and evaluate their relationship to medication and symptoms. We also considered possible 8 
mediatory mechanisms, and set out to discover what else could be learnt about the impairment in 9 
bipolar disorder by comparison to the profile of impairment in schizophrenia. The literature 10 
established that in bipolar disorder (i) some form of theory of mind impairment has been observed 11 
in all mood states, including euthymia, (ii) the form of theory of mind assessed and task used to 12 
make the assessment influence the impairment observed, and (iii) there might be some relationship 13 
to cognitive impairment, although a relationship to standard clinical variables was harder to 14 
establish. What also became clear in the literature on bipolar disorder itself was the possible 15 
relationship of theory of mind impairment to history of psychotic symptoms. Direct comparative 16 
studies including patients with schizophrenia were thus examined, and provided several important 17 
directions for future research on the bases of impairment in bipolar disorder. Particularly prominent 18 
was the issue of whether theory of mind impairment could be considered a candidate 19 
endophenotype for the psychoses, although current evidence suggests this may be premature. The 20 
differences in impairment across schizophrenia and bipolar disorder may, however, have genuine 21 
differential effects on social functioning and the likely success of remediation. 22 
 23 
Keywords: bipolar disorder, psychoses, schizophrenia, social cognition, theory of mind.  24 
 25 
Word Count: 9,890 26 
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‘Social cognition’ describes the mental operations that underlie social interactions, including 28 
perceiving, interpreting and generating responses to the intentions, dispositions and behaviours of 29 
others (Green et al., 2008). ‘Theory of mind’ is a crucial facet of social cognition, and can be 30 
defined as the ability to infer and predict the intentions, thoughts, desires, intuitions, behavioural 31 
reactions, plans and beliefs of other people (Green et al., 2008;Frith and Frith, 2011;Mathersul et al., 32 
2013), through an awareness that others have a mind with mental states, information and 33 
motivations that may differ from one’s own (Sabbagh, 2004;Korkmaz, 2011). Here cognitive theory 34 
of mind refers to the ability to make inferences about other people’s beliefs, whereas affective 35 
theory of mind refers to the ability to make inferences about other people’s feelings. A prominent 36 
feature of bipolar disorder is its significant negative impact on work-related, interpersonal and 37 
leisure activities (Elgie and Morselli, 2007). As theory of mind is so central to human life, any 38 
impairment of this cognitive capacity can only be detrimental to social functioning (Brune and 39 
Brune-Cohrs, 2006). The initial aim of this review is to further characterise the socio-cognitive 40 
profiles of patients with bipolar disorder by conducting a critical review of theory of mind in this 41 
patient group. This aim will be achieved via the presentation and synthesis of currently available 42 
published evidence. In recent years a number of reviews have either had to present broad overviews 43 
of theory of mind and other related social skills (Samame et al., 2012;McKinnon et al., 44 
2013;Samame, 2013;Van Rheenen and Rossell, 2014;Samame et al., 2015), or evaluate evidence 45 
from a range of related diagnostic groups (Bora et al., 2009b;Hoertnagl and Hofer, 2014). However, 46 
the recent surge of publications focussed on theory of mind in bipolar disorder allows us to now 47 
present a more focussed synopsis. In order to collate this evidence, a systematic search of the 48 
literature was conducted using the PsychINFO and Medline databases, covering the period from 49 
1975 up to September 2015. The search terms used in examining these databases were (bipolar 50 
AND (disorder OR depression)) OR (mania OR manic) OR (euthymia OR euthymic) OR ((mood 51 
OR affective) AND disorder)) AND ((“theory of mind”) OR mindedness OR mentalising OR 52 
mentalizing). Review articles touching on social cognition in bipolar disorder were also examined 53 
to check for studies not captured by the search above, through backward citation searching. After 54 
reviewing the literature gathered by these means, the following areas of discussion were identified. 55 
In the first part of the paper, we tackle the question of whether impaired theory of mind is 56 
characteristic across the mood states and whether it persists after symptomatic remission. Similarly 57 
we ask whether it is present in both bipolar I disorder and bipolar II disorder and consider whether it 58 
can be detected in related ‘high-risk’ or ‘sub-syndromal’ populations. We also examine the 59 
evidence for such impairments in paediatric samples. We then assess methodological factors which 60 
may have confounded previous research, such as the type of assessment used and demographic 61 
influences. Here we also highlight the seemingly varying scale of the problem and its breadth across 62 
different types of theory of mind. In the final section of part one, we seek to establish what the 63 
antecedents of impaired theory of mind are in bipolar disorder and what the symptom correlates of 64 
these deficits are. Medication effects are also considered. In achieving our initial aim, the hope is to 65 
generate information for clinicians who work with this patient group to help improve clinical 66 
outcomes (Mercer and Becerra, 2013). 67 
 In the second part of the paper, the aim is to review evidence on whether impaired theory of 68 
mind can be considered a trait-marker for psychosis across both affective and non-affective 69 
psychoses. Specifically, we ask whether patients with bipolar disorder and those with schizophrenia 70 
present with similar impairments. Here we do not set out to serve as a review of schizophrenic 71 
theory of mind per se, nor to make narrative comparisons between the separate literatures on theory 72 
of mind in the two disorders. Rather the purpose of this part of this paper is to establish the 73 
significance of data studies that have directly and quantitatively compared theory of mind abilities 74 
in the two disorders. Given the poorly understood origin of theory of mind deficits in bipolar 75 
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disorder, we evaluate the possibility that a link to psychosis should be an important line of enquiry 76 
(Bora et al., 2009b). Looking beyond the question of origin, could impaired theory of mind serve as 77 
a useful endophenotype of proneness to psychosis? We first tackle this question by reviewing 78 
studies of bipolar disorder which have compared the profile of impairment of theory of mind in 79 
bipolar patients who do and do not present with psychosis. We then move on to assessing studies 80 
which have explicitly contrasted theory of mind in schizophrenia vs. those in bipolar disorder. It is 81 
clear that theory of mind impairments in schizophrenia appear more severe than those in bipolar 82 
disorder. Reasons for the possible difference in size of impairment is examined, including both 83 
symptom and neurocognitive mediators. Close examination of the similarities and differences in 84 
theory of mind is important because of the impact of these deficits on social functioning, which in 85 
turn, might help explain the differences in outcome between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder 86 
(Donohoe et al., 2012). 87 
 We conclude the review by suggesting implications for clinical management and propose 88 
next steps for research on theory of mind in bipolar disorder and its possible role as a trait marker 89 
for psychosis. 90 
 91 
 92 
1. Impairments of theory of mind in bipolar disorder 93 
Given that impaired social cognition in patients with serious mental illness impacts on increased 94 
symptom severity, prolonged course of illness, higher rates of relapse and daily functioning, 95 
characterisation of the extent of these deficits is important (Henderson, 2013;Hoertnagl and Hofer, 96 
2014;Weightman et al., 2014). Although bipolar disorder is commoner than schizophrenia, theory 97 
of mind in this condition has been under-explored relative to its study in schizophrenia (Brune and 98 
Brune-Cohrs, 2006). We summarise current literature for the reader in Table 1.  99 
 100 
1.1 The clinical generalisability of impairments across sub-groups 101 
One issue that has complicated the study of theory of mind in bipolar disorder is that this 102 
diagnostic label actually comprises a group of disorders with heterogeneous clinical presentation, 103 
course and outcome (Duffy, 2014;Hasler and Wolf, 2015). Not only does the clinical course change 104 
as a patient cycles through recurrent depressive, manic and sometimes mixed mood states (Phillips 105 
and Kupfer, 2013), there are subtypes of bipolar disorder based on the severity of mania 106 
experienced, variable occurrence of psychosis within these subtypes (Parker et al., 2013), and 107 
related sub-syndromal bipolar subtypes to contend with (Leboyer and Kupfer, 2010). There has as 108 
yet, been little systematic comparison of impairments in theory of mind across all subtypes, even 109 
though the variability in clinical presentation might seem to necessitate it (Schenkel et al., 2014). It 110 
is likely that inconsistent results in the past may have partly reflected the heterogeneous 111 
presentation of bipolar disorder (Samame, 2013), the mixed nature of samples, and even 112 
indiscriminate mixing of samples with other affective disorders such as major depression (Inoue et 113 
al., 2004;Martino et al., 2011). Whilst the socio-cognitive profile of bipolar disorder across mood 114 
states is somewhat unclear (Hoertnagl and Hofer, 2014), currently available evidence suggests that 115 
some form of impairment exists whatever the symptomatic phase of illness (Bora et al., 2015).  116 
In one of the first studies to compare the performance of patients experiencing a depressed vs. 117 
manic mood state, the performance of both groups was impaired relative to healthy controls (Kerr et 118 
al., 2003). In a first-order ‘false-belief’ task, the ability to understand that someone can hold a belief 119 
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that is different from the actual state of affairs is assessed, whereas in a second-order false-belief 120 
task, participants have to infer the (false) beliefs of one character about the (false) beliefs of a 121 
second character (Frith and Corcoran, 1996). Kerr et al.’s data from such a False Belief Task 122 
showed that both groups were less able than healthy controls to correctly attribute mistaken beliefs 123 
about an object’s location to predict or explain someone’s behaviour. Similarly both patients in 124 
manic and depressed phases have demonstrated impairments (relative to healthy controls) on 125 
another classic theory of mind task known as the ‘Picture Sequencing Task’(Langdon et al., 1997), 126 
in which participants sequence a series of cartoon picture stories that depict cooperation and 127 
deception, followed by explicit questions about characters’ mental states (Wolf et al., 2010). These 128 
deficits persisted even when differences in age, intelligence and executive function were accounted 129 
for. Elsewhere, mixed manic/depressed patients have shown impaired performance on a series of 130 
theory of mind tasks relative to healthy controls (Ioannidi et al., 2015), including a false belief task, 131 
the ‘Hinting task’ which requires participants to infer from a subsequent hint what a character in a 132 
dialogue really meant (Corcoran et al., 1995), and the ‘Faux Pas Recognition Test’ (Baron-Cohen et 133 
al., 1999) in which participants have to recognise from a short text when a character commits a 134 
social error and says something it would be better not to say. However, no differences in 135 
performance were found in exploratory analyses of the effects of mixed/manic mood state vs. 136 
depressed and euthymic states in another study using the Picture Sequencing Task (Van Rheenen 137 
and Rossell, 2013b). Thus beyond there being evidence of theory of mind impairment across the 138 
different symptomatic phases which is suggestive of a potential trait marker, there is currently 139 
insufficient evidence to support the existence of a differential profile of impairment across the 140 
depressed, manic, hypomanic or mixed mood states. 141 
A more tractable means of assessing whether theory of mind deficits in bipolar disorder 142 
represent a trait marker independent of mood state, has been to adopt the study of remitted or 143 
asymptomatic patients that are euthymic at the time of testing. Whilst one might expect subtler 144 
theory of mind impairments in euthymic patients, the effects observed are certainly not negligible. 145 
Two important meta-analytic pieces of work have estimated that the effects sizes for theory of mind 146 
impairment in the euthymic state are in the medium range (0.5 < d < 0.8) (Samame et al., 147 
2012;Bora et al., 2015). Whilst the majority of studies of theory of mind in euthymic patients have 148 
found evidence of impairment (Bora et al., 2005;Olley et al., 2005;Montag et al., 2010;Barrera et al., 149 
2013), this has not universally been the case. Kerr et al were not able to detect any difference in 150 
performance between their group of euthymic patients and healthy controls (Kerr et al., 2003). 151 
Purcell et al were also unable to detect impaired theory of mind when their euthymic patients 152 
performed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task, in which participants attempt to match photos of 153 
the eye region during facial expressions with the corresponding emotional mental state word, 154 
thereby constituting a form of affective theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001;Purcell et al., 155 
2013). Elsewhere, the deficits shown by euthymic patients performing the Reading the Mind in the 156 
Eyes affective theory of mind task became non-significant once neurocognitive impairments were 157 
controlled for (Martino et al., 2011). Studies of theory of mind in the euthymic state are, however, 158 
confounded by variable definitions of euthymia which have, for example, included a score <6 on 159 
the Young Mania Rating Scale (YMRS; (Young et al., 1978)) and a score <7 on the Hamilton 160 
Depression Rating Scale (HDRS; (Hamilton, 1960)) (Bora et al., 2005), a HDRS score <14 and a 161 
YMRS <5 (Montag et al., 2010), or a HDRS score <12 and  YMRS <12 (Olley et al., 2005). These 162 
studies are thus potentially confounded by residual mood effects. Thus a distinction has thus been 163 
made between the performance of ‘sub-syndromal’ patients who score >7 but <15 on the HDRS, 164 
and truly euthymic patients who score <7 on the HDRS, with the performance of the former being 165 
more impaired than the latter (McKinnon et al., 2010). Nevertheless, beyond their theoretical 166 
importance, socio-cognitive deficits during euthymia are of notable clinical significance, given 167 
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evidence that such disturbances constitute an important obstacle for social reintegration and 168 
rehabilitation (Barrera et al., 2013).  169 
 In the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders classification system 170 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), the severity of mania experienced by a patient with 171 
bipolar disorder has specific diagnostic implications. Patients who have experienced a manic or 172 
mixed episode that has lasted at least a week, or those who have experienced mania that is so severe 173 
that it has required hospitalisation, are defined as having Bipolar 1 Disorder. In contrast, patients 174 
who have experienced less-intense elevated (hypomanic) moods, but no full-blown manic or mixed 175 
episodes, are defined as having Bipolar 2 Disorder. Most studies have so far focussed on the theory 176 
of mind impairment in Bipolar 1 Disorder, however, some more recent studies have included 177 
comparisons between Bipolar 1 and Bipolar 2 Disorder on the Picture Sequencing Task, the 178 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task, and the Cognitive and Affective Perspective Taking Task in 179 
which participants assess written scenarios and attribute characters’ mental state or belief based on 180 
cognitive or emotional information (Hynes et al., 2006). So far, none of these studies have found 181 
any evidence to support a differential theory of mind impairment (Martino et al., 2011;Van Rheenen 182 
and Rossell, 2013b;Schenkel et al., 2014).  183 
Whilst differential theory of mind impairment have not yet been demonstrated based on 184 
categorisation of bipolar disorder according to severity of mania, links have been found between 185 
theory of mind impairment and the severity of certain aspects of hypomania e.g. mood lability. 186 
Specifically, the study by Terrien et al. used the ‘Yoni task’ to assess the ability of healthy adults to 187 
attribute cognitive and emotional mental states on the basis of verbal cues and gaze direction 188 
(Terrien et al., 2014). In the Yoni task (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007), a trial comprises a cartoon 189 
outline of the face of a character named Yoni, and four coloured pictures of objects belonging to a 190 
single category (e.g. fruits, chairs) or faces, one in each corner of the computer screen. The 191 
participant’s task is to point to the correct answer (the image Yoni is referring to), based on a 192 
sentence that appears at the top of the screen, and available cues such as Yoni's eye gaze and Yoni's 193 
facial expression. With this task, Terrien et al. demonstrated that mood volatility showed a 194 
relationship with theory of mind performance collapsed across cognitive and affective theory of 195 
mind, but only in men. These findings raise the important issue of whether it is possible to detect 196 
impaired theory of mind in populations at increased risk of developing bipolar disorder, either 197 
through possession of traits and behaviours related to particular clinical dimensions, or through a 198 
genetic predisposition to developing bipolar disorder. Does theory of mind impairment constitute a 199 
useful cognitive endophenotype for bipolar disorder? In this vein, Reynolds et al. detected impaired 200 
theory of mind in first-degree relatives of patients with bipolar disorder using the ‘Strange Stories 201 
Task’ (Happe, 1994) in which participants read a series of stories and answer questions about 202 
characters’ mental states or physical events (Reynolds et al., 2014). However, in another relevant 203 
study, children and adolescents with a parent with bipolar disorder who themselves exhibited some 204 
mood dysregulation but did not meet the diagnostic criteria for bipolar disorder, appeared 205 
unimpaired according to a task measuring recognition of mental states and identification of false 206 
beliefs (Whitney et al., 2013). The predictive value of theory of mind impairments in ‘at risk’ 207 
populations is therefore not yet clear (McKinnon et al., 2013), and further study of whether this 208 
deficit antedates bipolar disorder or not is required. Work that searches to identify potential ‘early 209 
warning’ signs is important, because identification of earlier stages of bipolar disorder prior to the 210 
first manic episode, may help develop interventions to prevent or delay its onset (Ratheesh et al., 211 
2015).  212 
 213 
In this section we have seen that there is a reasonable level of evidence to indicate that theory of 214 
mind impairment is a feature of all mood states in bipolar disorder, although robust differential 215 
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patterns across the various subtypes are not yet supported. That is not necessarily to say that there 216 
are no such effects, at this early stage in the literature it may simply be that there has not yet been 217 
enough research. What are now needed are more systematic, well-controlled investigations. 218 
However, given the existence of any evidence of mood-state related impairments, heterogeneity 219 
needs to be taken into account in future research (Samame et al., 2015). Ideally, such investigation 220 
would be longitudinal and entail a patient acting as their own control whilst experiencing different 221 
mood states. Via such endeavours, a more well-grounded picture of the socio-cognitive profile of 222 
bipolar disorder across mood-states will emerge (Olley et al., 2005). The recent longitudinal study 223 
by Ioannidi et al. examining cognitive theory of mind impairment across both the remitted and 224 
symptomatic state is an excellent start in this respect (Ioannidi et al., 2015). Irrespective of 225 
theoretical implications, monitoring of theory of mind impairment in euthymic as well as 226 
symptomatic states has significant clinical value, since it might potentially prove a useful indicator 227 
of relapse potential in euthymia (Wolf et al., 2010;McKinnon et al., 2013;Mercer and Becerra, 228 
2013;Terrien et al., 2014). Longitudinal analyses would also provide valuable information on the 229 
course of impact that theory of mind impairment has. Early work already suggests an association 230 
between affective theory of mind impairment and social functioning one year later (Purcell et al., 231 
2013).  232 
 233 
1.2 Methodological generalisability 234 
Just as for the heterogeneity of mood states associated with bipolar disorder, the tasks used to 235 
assess theory of mind are heterogeneous in both content and form. To some extent, this has been a 236 
necessary evil, since theory of mind is not a unitary construct (Samame, 2013;Bora et al., 2015). 237 
Hence in this section, we consider both the pattern of differential impairment across different forms 238 
of theory of mind, and the possible influence of the theory of mind test used. It would perhaps be 239 
premature to assume that cognitive and affective theory of mind are equally affected by bipolar 240 
disorder, given the putative evidence for the (partial) separability in functional neuroanatomy 241 
(Mitchell and Phillips, 2015) of these two types, and their differing component sub-processes. 242 
Indeed, there is evidence for differential behavioural impairment in other populations, including old 243 
age, schizophrenia, autism and neurodegenerative disease (Poletti et al., 2012;Wang and Su, 244 
2013;Chung et al., 2014). Using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task to index affective theory of 245 
mind and the Faux Pas test to index cognitive theory of mind, Barrera et al. directly compared the 246 
performance of euthymic patients on these two forms of theory of mind. Whereas the patients with 247 
bipolar disorder did show impairment relative to healthy controls on the cognitive theory of mind 248 
test, they were not impaired on the affective theory of mind test (Barrera et al., 2013). Here the 249 
authors argued that the lack of impairment for affective theory of mind might reflect the relative 250 
lack of mood disturbance in euthymic patients. This suggestion is in accord with findings in three 251 
more-controlled studies of a greater impairment of cognitive theory of mind in  bipolar disorder 252 
than affective theory of mind using questions about feeling vs. thinking within the same task 253 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009;Montag et al., 2010;Schenkel et al., 2014). However, in the Schenkel 254 
et al. study, the patients were experiencing an acute episode of bipolar disorder, not euthymia 255 
(Schenkel et al., 2014). Hence the lack of current affective disturbance typically associated with 256 
euthymia cannot explain the lack of affective theory of mind impairment in that study. However, 257 
even though the cognitive and affective questions comprised part of the same task in the Schenkel et 258 
al. study, these questions still required different cognitive operations. Whereas the affective theory 259 
of mind questions required first-order mental state understanding and empathy (e.g. ‘how does the 260 
character feel’), the cognitive theory of mind questions entailed more advanced mental state 261 
reasoning and false belief understanding (e.g. ‘how a character might be misled into believing 262 
something is false based on false information from someone else’). Therefore at present, it cannot 263 
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be ruled out that differential impairment of cognitive vs. affective theory of mind might simply 264 
reflect a difference in degree of complexity or a difference in demand for linguistic processing. 265 
Overall, findings from a recent meta-analysis of performance of cognitive vs. affective theory of 266 
mind tasks by patients with bipolar disorder demonstrate that the differences noted above have not 267 
yet attained statistical significance across the body of current literature (Bora et al., 2015). 268 
Differing processing demands are also relevant to the inconsistent impairments according to the 269 
tasks used to index the ability to make mental state inferences. For example, in one study, whilst 270 
patients with Bipolar 1 Disorder showed impairments on a first-order false belief task, the Hinting 271 
Task, and the Faux Pas Test, only impaired performance on the Faux Pas Test persisted when 272 
patients later transitioned into euthymia (Ioannidi et al., 2015). Similarly, in another study, first-273 
degree relatives of patients with bipolar disorder demonstrated impairment on the Happé Strange 274 
Stories Test, but not the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task, nor the Picture Sequencing Task 275 
(Reynolds et al., 2014). These differential task-dependent impairments have recently been 276 
quantified in a task-specific meta-analysis. In that work, small but significant effect sizes were 277 
obtained for differences in performance between patients and healthy controls with the Hinting and 278 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Tasks (0.27 and 0.45 respectively), but a medium effect size was 279 
obtained for the difference in performance on the Faux Pas test (0.58). One of the more common 280 
explanations for this task-dependency has been differences in the complexity of theory of mind 281 
processing being assessed (Samame, 2013). False belief tasks have become the gold standard for 282 
assessing young children's understanding of mind, but these tasks only index basic mentalising, and 283 
for typically developing children, performance is significantly above chance by the age of four 284 
(Wellman et al., 2001). Although understanding false beliefs marks an important milestone in 285 
theory of mind development, it does not equip children with all they need to know about people's 286 
lives and minds. Advanced theory of mind skills develop later i.e. during middle childhood and 287 
beyond (Lagattuta et al., 2015), and are necessitated by more complex aspects of social interactions. 288 
These more advanced forms not only require participants to understand differences in belief 289 
between characters, but also require them to detect and comprehend more subtle constructs such as 290 
white lies, jokes, irony, and faux pas. An inter-related distinction also used to explain task-291 
dependent impairments of theory of mind in bipolar disorder has been that between verbal and non-292 
verbal tasks (Samame, 2013). For example, first-degree relatives of patients with bipolar disorder 293 
have demonstrated impaired verbal theory of mind (on the Happé Strange Stories Task), but no 294 
impairment on visual theory of mind tasks (Picture Sequencing Task, Reading the Mind in the Eyes 295 
Task)(Reynolds et al., 2014). This result was explained by the authors as reflecting the more 296 
demanding nature of the two visual tasks (cognitively and affectively demanding respectively). It is 297 
therefore a recapitulation of the distinction above, albeit in altered form. 298 
A second distinction used to explain task-dependent theory of mind impairments is that of 299 
decoding vs. reasoning. Whereas decoding more closely approximates the perception of mental 300 
state cues, the latter places higher demands on domain-general cognitive resources such as working 301 
memory and executive function (McKinnon et al., 2013). This particular distinction provides an 302 
alternative explanation of why some studies might have failed to detect impaired affective theory of 303 
mind in euthymia, but still have evidenced impaired cognitive theory of mind (Martino et al., 304 
2011;Barrera et al., 2013). The affective theory of mind task used in these two studies - the Reading 305 
the Mind in the Eyes Task - is essentially a measure of the ability to decode likely emotional state 306 
on the basis of perceptual information. In contrast, the cognitive theory of mind task - the Faux Pas 307 
Test - is a much more complex test requiring reasoning about whether someone said something that 308 
someone else might not want to hear. These results therefore suggest that perceptually-based theory 309 
of mind impairments may not always be detected, whilst reasoning-based theory of mind 310 
impairments may be easier to detect.  311 
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 In this section, we have seen that the results of prior literature on theory of mind 312 
impairments in bipolar disorder cannot be taken at face value without considering the influence of 313 
methodological choices such as (i) the level of complexity of theory of mind being assessed, and (ii) 314 
the generic cognitive demands of the task used for assessment. In particular, some tasks are not able 315 
to detect the subtle impairments that might present in euthymic patients (Olley et al., 2005). 316 
Therefore in the future, a broader array of theory of mind tasks is warranted (Schenkel et al., 2014). 317 
In research on other populations, there have been calls for theory of mind tasks to become more 318 
ecological in nature and better mimic real-life scenarios (Garrido-Vasquez et al., 2011;Achim et al., 319 
2013;Mathersul et al., 2013).  320 
 321 
1.3 Cognitive and clinical correlates 322 
In the previous section, it was suggested that the cognitive demand of different theory of mind 323 
tasks might influence the patterns of deficits observed in bipolar disorder. Indeed, a relationship 324 
between cognitive demand and theory of mind may not be surprising given the inherent overlap 325 
between neurocognition and social cognition (Van Rheenen and Rossell, 2014). So, what are the 326 
neuropsychological correlates of the theory of mind impairments? There are two important aspects 327 
to this question, first do impairments persist when neurocognitive performance is controlled for, and 328 
secondly, how does neurocognitive performance correlate with patients’ capacity for theory of mind. 329 
Many correlations were reported between performance of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task 330 
and neurocognitive function in the first such study, including correlations with sustained attention, 331 
verbal fluency and psychomotor speed (Bora et al., 2005). Further, global cognitive impairment 332 
(reduced IQ) has been shown to correlate significantly with theory of mind impairment in a recent 333 
meta-analysis (Bora et al., 2015). The co-existence of theory of mind impairments with impairments 334 
of executive functions such as inhibitory control has received further support from later research 335 
with comprehensive neurocognitive batteries (Wolf et al., 2010;Van Rheenen et al., 2014), and 336 
correlations with sustained attention impairments seem particularly strong (Lahera et al., 2008). 337 
These findings co-exist with demonstrations whereby supposed theory of mind deficits disappear 338 
once differences in neurocognition such as attention, verbal memory and visuo-spatial memory are 339 
controlled for (Martino et al., 2011;Ioannidi et al., 2015). However, this mediating role for 340 
executive functions is not a universal finding (Reynolds et al., 2014). Further, in theory of mind 341 
studies that have incorporated matched cognitive control conditions, impaired theory of mind does 342 
not necessarily co-occur with impaired performance in that control condition (Kerr et al., 2003;Van 343 
Rheenen and Rossell, 2013b). Questions therefore remain as to why this relationship is not 344 
universal. Careful more extensive research with well-powered samples is required, perhaps with 345 
neurocognitive tests that more specifically assess individual domains of executive function (Olley et 346 
al., 2005). 347 
 We next turn to consider clinical correlates of theory of mind impairments in bipolar 348 
disorder. Here the evidence is patchy, inconsistent, and incomplete, although currently available 349 
evidence does not favour reliable links with basic clinical variables (Bora et al., 2015). The only 350 
positive findings that exist so far is a possible association between performance of theory of mind 351 
tasks and illness duration (McKinnon et al., 2010;Wolf et al., 2010). Taken at face value, this 352 
suggests that theory of mind impairment is progressive, and that further study might be wise to 353 
determine in which direction the effects occur. However, elsewhere demonstration of this 354 
association has not been repeated (Martino et al., 2011), and meta-analysis of the links between 355 
socio-cognitive impairment and length of illness in bipolar disorder suggest there is insufficient 356 
evidence to take the relationship between theory of mind impairment and illness duration seriously 357 
(Samame et al., 2015). Other attempts to links basic clinical variables with theory of mind 358 
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impairment in bipolar disorder have failed to find support for an association with the number of 359 
illness episodes experienced (Bora et al., 2005;McKinnon et al., 2010;Martino et al., 2011), or age 360 
of onset (Bora et al., 2005;McKinnon et al., 2010;Wolf et al., 2010).  361 
Perhaps more surprising has been the failure to find support for the impact of theory of mind 362 
impairment on social functioning as discussed elsewhere for other psychiatric disorders (McDonald, 363 
2013;Pinkham, 2014;Van Rheenen and Rossell, 2014;Weightman et al., 2014). In the first study of 364 
this type, although patients with bipolar disorder in remission were impaired on a verbal theory of 365 
mind measure, the impairments showed no relationship with social and occupational functioning as 366 
indexed by the Life Functioning Questionnaire (Olley et al., 2005). Generalisability was widened 367 
with the demonstration by Barrera et al using different theory of mind and social functioning 368 
measures in which they observed that neither scores on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task nor 369 
scores on the Faux Pas Test correlated with global functioning according to the Functioning 370 
Assessment Short Test (Barrera et al., 2013). These two studies did, however, test euthymic patients, 371 
who are perhaps less likely to show sizeable functional impairments relative to symptomatic 372 
patients, and both assessed only a small sample of patients (N=12 and N=15 respectively). Yet 373 
similar patterns have emerged in larger datasets from symptomatic patients. In a study by Cusi et al., 374 
performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task did not correlate with any social domain on 375 
the Social Adjustment Self-Report Scale in a mixed sample of Bipolar 1 Disorder patients with 376 
varying levels of depressive symptoms (Cusi et al., 2012a). Further, a subsequent study by Benito et 377 
al. uncovered no evidence for an association between performance of the Hinting Task and global 378 
functioning according to the Functioning Assessment Short Test (Benito et al., 2013). However, a 379 
prospective study by Purcell et al. produced the interesting finding that abnormally short response 380 
times on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task predicted greater life functioning impairment as 381 
assessed by the Life Functioning Questionnaire (Purcell et al., 2013). Thus whilst theory of mind 382 
impairment might not predict concurrent social functioning, it may be able to predict the likelihood 383 
of further decline. Alternatively, as suggested by the authors, since the prospective relationship was 384 
with response times on the theory of mind task rather than accuracy, it may be the case that quick 385 
mental state inferences are more helpful in understanding functional impairment. 386 
 As lamented by others (Samame, 2013), only a handful of studies have investigated the 387 
potential influences of medication on theory of mind performance such as duration of exposure, 388 
dose effects, or the type of medication being taken. Yet, as can be seen from Table 1, the 389 
medication profile of participant samples is often markedly heterogeneous, both across- and within-390 
studies, and receipt of multiple medications is common. This poses a major potential confound. 391 
Often studies are underpowered to make statistical comparisons of the effects of different classes of 392 
medication, analyses are cursory and retrospective, with possible medication effects frequently 393 
being cited as study limitations. This has, in part, resulted from the challenges associated with 394 
accessing unmedicated samples of patients with bipolar disorder and from variations in medication 395 
profile inherent to the heterogeneity of bipolar disorder. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results of ad 396 
hoc analyses have been negative where attempted. Shamay-Tsoory et al. divided their patients into 397 
three groups according to the medications being received: lithium (N=9), carbamazepine (N=6), and 398 
sodium valproate (N=4). However, these three subgroups did not differ in either cognitive or 399 
affective theory of mind performance (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Post-hoc analyses by Van 400 
Rheenen et al. also failed to detect an influence on theory of mind performance according to 401 
whether a patient was on vs. off antipsychotics, antidepressants, mood stabilisers, or 402 
benzodiazepines (Van Rheenen and Rossell, 2013b). Elsewhere, amongst people at high-risk for 403 
bipolar disorder, previous lifetime exposure to psychotropic medication (self-report) has also been 404 
shown not to influence theory of mind performance (Whitney et al., 2013). A more definitive study 405 
by Bora et al, examined correlations between serum lithium levels and theory of mind performance 406 
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on both the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task and the Hinting Task in euthymic patients with 407 
Bipolar 1 Disorder, but did not detect any such relationship (Bora et al., 2005). Medication effects 408 
on theory of mind have also been quantified and compared using the Clinical Scale of Intensity, 409 
Frequency, and Duration of Psychopharmacological Treatment, to index current exposure to 410 
different classes of medication on a scale from 0-5. Whilst that study also failed to find evidence of 411 
medication effects in either Bipolar 1 or Bipolar 2 disorder on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 412 
Task, a significant correlation was observed with performance on the Faux Pas test (Martino et al., 413 
2011). Further, once exposure to benzodiazepines was controlled for, performance on the Faux Pas 414 
test no longer allowed the prediction of whether a participant was a patient or healthy control. There 415 
is currently a lack of optimism as to whether psychotropic medications such as those prescribed for 416 
bipolar disorder improve social cognition (Hempel et al., 2010;Kucharska-Pietura and Mortimer, 417 
2013). However, as to whether these drugs worsen social cognitions such as theory of mind, further 418 
research is required. 419 
In this section, we have seen evidence that theory of mind impairment often co-exists 420 
alongside cognitive impairments, particularly those relating to executive functions. Further, some of 421 
these cognitive impairments correlate with, or predict, the degree of theory of mind impairment. 422 
Thus there is now a sufficient evidence base to warrant further investigation to flesh out our 423 
understanding of the relationship between the two, and how the mechanism of effects fits together 424 
(Brune and Brune-Cohrs, 2006;Samame, 2013). For both therapeutic purposes and theoretical 425 
reasons, it is particularly important to establish whether theory of mind impairment in bipolar 426 
disorder is primary in origin, or simply secondary to cognitive impairment. Regarding medication 427 
effects on theory of mind, not only are they of interest in their own right, they present an important 428 
confound to the comparison of results from prior studies (Samame et al., 2012). Yet, often studies 429 
only provide broad information on the drug classes being received, without identifying the name of 430 
the specific medicine being received. This needs to be rectified, although the separate effects of 431 
specific drugs will always be difficult to tease apart where patients are concurrently in receipt of 432 
multiple medications. Regarding clinical correlates, theory of mind studies in bipolar disorder are 433 
now accumulating, but they do not always examine the relation between social cognition and 434 
clinical variables (Samame, 2013). Future research that focussed on core issues concerning the 435 
evolution of theory of mind impairment in response to changes in clinical course, could enable more 436 
responsive, dynamic and individualised patient care in social and occupational contexts (Cusi et al., 437 
2012a). 438 
 439 
1.4 Clinical implications and next steps 440 
It has been recognised for some time now that establishing a clear pattern of theory of mind 441 
deficits in bipolar disorder may have profound implications for the clinical management of patients. 442 
Difficulties in understanding the mental state of others can result in the misreading of social cues, 443 
resulting in a reduced ability to accurately comprehend social interactions (Ang and Pridmore, 444 
2009). Patients with impaired theory of mind are therefore unlikely to understand the impact of their 445 
behaviour on others, and this may contribute to their willingness to indulge in reckless or dangerous 446 
activities (Rodrigo et al., 2014;Sandvik et al., 2014). Moreover, difficulty in understanding the 447 
perspective of others may be an impediment to some psychological interventions (Fonagy and 448 
Allison, 2014;Weinstein et al., 2014). Regarding the next phase of research we make the following 449 
suggestions. First, the adoption of standardised task design would be prudent where possible, as has 450 
become commonplace for the study of child populations (Brooks and Meltzoff, 2015;Moll et al., 451 
2015), or as afforded by well-validated tests e.g. ‘The Awareness of Social Inference Test’ 452 
(McDonald et al., 2003;Spunt and Adolphs, 2014), which has been extensively normed across 453 
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adolescent, young- and middle aged populations, and assessed for reliability, practice effects, and 454 
education- and IQ-independent consistency. This latter test assess the ability to perceive social 455 
inferences both with (minimal context) and without the benefit of additional information revealing 456 
the protagonist’s true thoughts or feelings (enriched context), in order to assess whether participants 457 
are able to integrate and use explicit contextual information regarding speaker beliefs. Second, 458 
comprehensive neuropsychological batteries should be administered routinely alongside the theory 459 
of mind paradigms, e.g., the International Society for Bipolar Disorders-Battery for Assessment of 460 
Neurocognition (ISBD-BANC) (Yatham et al., 2010), to separate out the effects of cognitive 461 
impairment and theory of mind impairment. Third, further research should adopt more ecological 462 
theory of mind tests e.g. incorporating video-based material or virtual reality scenarios (Achim et al., 463 
2013;Henry et al., 2015). We do not suggest that these should replace use of the controlled 464 
simplistic tasks currently in use, as these have the capacity to isolate specific individual aspects of 465 
the impairment. On the other hand, although perception of cues from isolated modalities is of 466 
theoretical interest, such an approach lacks the ecological validity of multi-modal cues in 467 
naturalistic settings. In some populations e.g. older adults, it has even been demonstrated that 468 
impairments of social cognition are reduced in magnitude when more life-like assessments are used 469 
(Hunter et al., 2010;Lambrecht et al., 2012). Related to this is the predominant use of static 470 
photographs at present. In contrast, dynamic stimuli are also ecologically valid and are information-471 
rich, which facilitates more accurate understanding (Murphy et al., 2010;Fiorentini and Viviani, 472 
2011;Phillips and Slessor, 2011;Ruffman, 2011). Evaluating the performance of patients with 473 
bipolar disorder when responding to theory of mind cues in more realistic situations will allow us to 474 
better understand how these impairments might translate into impairments in daily living. For 475 
example, the video modality adopted by Montag et al. for the purposes of evaluating more subtle 476 
impairments, in which participants view a film showing two women and two men spending an 477 
evening together, with the instruction to try to understand the feelings, thoughts and intentions of 478 
the characters, for the purposes of answering a series of multiple-choice questions (Montag et al., 479 
2010). Fourth, more longitudinal studies are needed. In addition to the benefits discussed earlier, 480 
this endeavour would facilitate a better understanding of whether the deficits are static or 481 
progressive, which has important implications for characterising the natural history of bipolar 482 
disorder, its clinical management and more accurate prediction of the likely functional deficits 483 
ahead. This might be enhanced by parallel studies of changes in functional neuroanatomy over time, 484 
to help establish the underlying mechanisms of change (Cusi et al., 2012b).  485 
 486 
2 Comparative assessments of theory of mind in bipolar disorder and schizophrenia 487 
In terms of the type of symptoms within bipolar disorder that might associate with theory of 488 
mind impairments, there have been a number of suggestions, including impulsivity (Purcell et al., 489 
2013;Hoertnagl and Hofer, 2014) and affect (Bora et al., 2005;McKinnon et al., 2010). However, 490 
the most prevalent discussions have centred on a possible association with psychotic symptoms or 491 
history of psychosis. Indeed it has been claimed that theory of mind impairment is characteristic of 492 
all the major psychoses, irrespective of diagnosis (Bora et al., 2009b;Guastella et al., 2013). This 493 
makes sense given the partial overlap in symptoms across schizophrenia and bipolar disorder 494 
(Lewandowski et al., 2011;Rosen et al., 2011;Wilson and Sponheim, 2014), and the common 495 
occurrence of psychosis in the manic state (Lindenmayer et al., 2008;Basso et al., 2009;Ostergaard 496 
et al., 2013). The hypothesis that theory of mind impairments might present in both schizophrenia 497 
and bipolar disorder is further motivated by the partial overlap in genetic basis between the two 498 
disorders (Tiwari et al., 2010;Cardno and Owen, 2014). Therefore we now turn to more substantive 499 
methodology, and evaluate theory of mind studies that have directly compared patients with 500 
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diagnoses of bipolar disorder against those with diagnoses of schizophrenia. We summarise reports 501 
of direct comparisons of theory of mind impairment in these two patient groups in Table 2. Here we 502 
do not seek to serve a review of literature on theory of mind impairments in schizophrenia per se. 503 
For that the interested reader is referred to works elsewhere (Sprong et al., 2007;Pickup, 2008;Bora 504 
et al., 2009a;Biedermann et al., 2012;Gavilan Ibanez and Garcia-Albea Ristol, 2013).  505 
 506 
2.1 Relative scale of impairment 507 
One of the most prominent issues amongst studies comparing performance on theory of 508 
mind tasks across bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, is the question of whether the impairments 509 
are of equal magnitude. The use of traditional theory of mind tests such as the Reading the Mind in 510 
the Eyes and the Faux Pas Tests provide some evidence that the impairments observed in 511 
schizophrenia might be greater than those in patients with bipolar disorder (Donohoe et al., 512 
2012;Caletti et al., 2013). However, the results are not always positive. In one study, no differences 513 
in performance were observed between patients with schizophrenia vs. bipolar disorder performing 514 
the Happé Strange Stories task (Rossell and Van Rheenen, 2013). Similarly, whilst patients with 515 
schizophrenia, and bipolar patients with and without psychosis all showed deficits on the Reading 516 
the Mind in the Eyes and Hinting tasks, the level of impairment for each task was similar across the 517 
three patient groups (Thaler et al., 2013). One explanation is that if the theory of mind impairment 518 
is linked to current psychosis, the deficit should show a relationship to symptom severity 519 
irrespective of diagnosis, and therefore between-group differences might not necessarily be 520 
expected. There is certainly some supporting evidence for this (Marjoram et al., 2005;Guastella et 521 
al., 2013).  522 
A second explanation for the variable support for theory of mind impairments being greater 523 
for schizophrenia than for bipolar disorder is that as mentioned above, these simple tests lack 524 
ecological validity (Lahera et al., 2015), which has promoted other studies wishing to compare the 525 
impairments in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder to use more ecological tests. Here, the evidence 526 
for greater impairment in schizophrenia is more convincing, which implies that patients with 527 
schizophrenia might only show greater theory of mind impairments than those in bipolar disorder 528 
on more demanding or more life-like tests (Lee et al., 2013;Rowland et al., 2013). The Versailles-529 
Situational Intention Reading task also comprises video excerpts, and requires participants to rate 530 
the probabilities of affirmations of the intentions of different characters. With this task, a similar 531 
story emerges, and patients with schizophrenia again showed greater deficits than patients with 532 
bipolar disorder, but whilst the difference between schizophrenic and depressed patients was 533 
significant, the difference between schizophrenic and manic patients was not quite significant 534 
(Bazin et al., 2009).  535 
 536 
2.2 Symptomatic and cognitive mediators of the differences 537 
Given that patients with schizophrenia are sometimes more impaired than patients with bipolar 538 
disorder, the question becomes what is driving these differences? In cross-diagnosis theory of mind 539 
studies differences between the patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder with respect to 540 
various basic clinical factors often occur, including substance abuse (Caletti et al., 2013), and 541 
number of hospitalisations (Thaler et al., 2013). Beyond striving to match such basic clinical 542 
variables, another important target is to match for generic severe mental illness pathology, so that 543 
any differences in theory of mind impairment can then be attributed to the disorders themselves 544 
rather than generic differences in symptom severity. When theory of mind in patients with 545 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have been analysed taking account of broad symptom variables 546 
such as depression, positive and negative symptoms, these types of factors are not always 547 
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significant predictors of impairment (Lee et al., 2013;Thaler et al., 2014). Moreover, differences in 548 
theory of mind performance often remain significant after statistically controlling for differences in 549 
these broad measures (Donohoe et al., 2012).  550 
Matching for level of positive symptoms at the recruitment rather than statistical analysis stage 551 
has further facilitated evaluation of theory of mind impairment according to disorder. When this 552 
approach was adopted, patients with schizophrenia still showed a greater theory of mind impairment 553 
than patients with bipolar disorder (Rossell and Van Rheenen, 2013), implying that factors other 554 
than psychosis must also contribute to differences in performance between the patient groups. Yet 555 
weight to a cross-diagnostic link between theory of mind impairment and specific positive 556 
symptoms has been provided by Marjoram et al., who evidenced such a relationship across patients 557 
with schizophrenia and a mixed group of patients with unipolar or bipolar depression. Rather than 558 
the theory of mind impairment being disease-specific and only occurring in patients with 559 
schizophrenia, they observed a cross-diagnostic symptom-specific relationship between 560 
performance of the Hinting task and positive symptoms as indexed by severity of 561 
hallucinations/delusions (Marjoram et al., 2005). A similar story emerges from other comparisons, 562 
such as the demonstration by Guastella et al. that performance of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 563 
Test was a strong predictor of global positive symptoms across patients with likely psychotic vs. 564 
bipolar illness (Guastella et al., 2013). Interestingly, when the theory of mind performance of 565 
patients with schizophrenia who did vs. did not show evidence of thought disorder (another positive 566 
symptom) was compared to the performance of patients with bipolar disorder, it was only 567 
performance of the schizophrenic patients with thought disorder that was impaired relative to 568 
healthy controls (Sarfati and Hardy-Bayle, 1999). The performance of the patients with 569 
schizophrenia without thought disorder was comparable to that of patients with bipolar disorder, 570 
again suggesting a link between theory of mind impairment and specific symptoms of psychosis, 571 
rather than a general increase in impairment in schizophrenia.  572 
Thus there may be two co-existing patterns of results, namely a symptom-specific relationship 573 
between theory of mind impairment and certain positive symptoms that is independent of diagnosis, 574 
and another unidentified cause of the differences. As to what the likely cause is of this other 575 
unidentified contribution to the differences, there are a number of candidates. Attributional style has 576 
been explored in patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and whilst both groups showed 577 
evidence of hostile socio-cognitive biases, theory of mind impairment on the Hinting Task was still 578 
greater in patients with schizophrenia than in bipolar disorder, thus ruling attribution style out as a 579 
possible mediator (Lahera et al., 2015). Emotion regulation has also been investigated. Whilst 580 
patients with schizophrenia showed significantly greater theory of mind impairment than those with 581 
bipolar disorder, and distinct patterns of cognitive strategies were used to regulate emotion in the 582 
two patient groups (schizophrenia: more likely to engage in catastrophising and rumination; bipolar 583 
disorder: more likely to blame themselves and less likely to engage in positive reappraisal), 584 
associations between theory of mind performance and affect regulation were not observed in either 585 
group (Rowland et al., 2013). As to the possibility that differences in medication doseage or 586 
medication type between patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder might influence 587 
differential theory of mind impairment, variability and multiplicity in the medications patients are 588 
receiving makes the comparison of respective medication effects difficult (Rossell and Van 589 
Rheenen, 2013;Thaler et al., 2014). However, it is perhaps unlikely that medication differences 590 
might drive differences in theory of mind performance. First, antipsychotic equivalence dosage 591 
appears to have no effect on theory of mind performance i.e. there is no evidence of correlation 592 
between the two (Sarfati and Hardy-Bayle, 1999;Marjoram et al., 2005;Donohoe et al., 2012). 593 
Second, use of antipsychotic medication did not alter the predictive power of performance on the 594 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test in relation to severity of positive symptoms (Guastella et al., 595 
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2013). Thirdly, when the theory of mind performance of bipolar patients taking antipsychotics is 596 
compared to the performance of bipolar patients not taking antipsychotics, no significant 597 
differences were observed (Lee et al., 2013).  598 
Another potential mediator of differences in theory of mind performance worthy of 599 
consideration is the differences in cognitive impairment between these two patient groups (Harvey 600 
et al., 2010;Andreou and Bozikas, 2013;Bakkour et al., 2014). This is a factor that comparative 601 
studies of theory of mind across bipolar disorder and schizophrenia do not always control for, 602 
leaving the door open for differences in cognitive function between the two groups to confound 603 
differences in theory of mind impairment. In the direct comparative literature, both differences in 604 
theory of mind impairment and in cognitive function in the verbal memory, episodic memory, 605 
working memory, attentional, visual learning, reasoning, and processing speed domains have been 606 
shown to co-exist in patients with schizophrenia vs. bipolar disorder, but the impact of specific 607 
cognitive differences on differences in theory of mind performance have not been analysed 608 
(Donohoe et al., 2012;Caletti et al., 2013;Lee et al., 2013). The evidence for a differential influence 609 
of general cognitive ability initially appears a little stronger, since IQ has been shown to correlate 610 
with performance of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test in patients with schizophrenia but not in 611 
patients with bipolar disorder, and vice versa for performance of the Hinting Task (Donohoe et al., 612 
2012). However, the inclusion of IQ when analysing differences in theory of mind does not tend to 613 
change the pattern of differences observed for the two disorders (Donohoe et al., 2012;Rossell and 614 
Van Rheenen, 2013).  615 
 616 
2.3 The implications of differential impairments  617 
In the literature focussing exclusively on bipolar disorder, moves to link the experience of 618 
psychosis with increased theory of mind impairment have, although derived from a strong rationale, 619 
have not yet been particularly productive. Bora et al. found no impact of history of psychosis on 620 
performance of the Hinting Task when comparing twenty six patients with such a history to 17 621 
patients with no past history, but at the time of testing the patients were euthymic (Bora et al., 2005). 622 
However, in another study, performance of that task by symptomatic patients showed no difference 623 
between patients with and without past history of psychosis (Benito et al., 2013). The same pattern 624 
has been noted for other theory of mind tests such as the Happé Strange Stories Task (Lahera et al., 625 
2008), and for the relationship of history of psychosis to cognitive and affective theory of mind 626 
(Barrera et al., 2013), and for both Bipolar 1 and Bipolar 2 Disorder (Martino et al., 2011). It might 627 
therefore be concluded that theory of mind deficits do not constitute a vulnerability marker for 628 
psychosis. However, in schizophrenia itself, theory of mind deficits lessen when patients are in 629 
remission (Bora et al., 2009a;Wang et al., 2013). Thus seeking to link deficits to a history of 630 
psychosis once bipolar patients are no longer experiencing psychosis may be less likely to succeed 631 
than if testing patients currently experiencing psychosis. We might not yet be using the most 632 
optimal methods to evaluate the research questions being pursued in this field. 633 
In the first part of this review, we considered whether theory of mind impairment could be a 634 
trait marker for bipolar disorder across different mood states. Here the question is could a theory of 635 
mind impairment go one step further, and serve as a useful cognitive endophenotype of proneness to 636 
psychosis? There are certainly examples of non-social cognition being accepted as candidate 637 
endophenotypes for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia (Raust et al., 2014;Reilly and Sweeney, 638 
2014), and if theory of mind impairments prove to be an endophenotype for the psychoses, this 639 
knowledge could ultimately aid in efforts to identify risk-related genes for this group of disorders, 640 
as well as in prevention and early intervention. At present, yes theory of mind impairments are 641 
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present in both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, but attempts to link these findings as originating 642 
from a common (genetic) cause have not yet been as successful as was hoped (Lee et al., 2013). It 643 
remains to be proven unequivocally that theory of mind impairment in bipolar disorder and 644 
schizophrenia occurs specifically because the two are both types of psychosis (Lee et al., 2013),. 645 
Future studies might benefit from expanding the comparisons to explore theory of mind impairment 646 
in other related disorders such as schizoaffective disorder, schizophreniform disorder, and 647 
schizotypal personality disorder (Bora et al., 2009b;Bora and Pantelis, 2013).  648 
Despite the uncertain nature of the association of theory of mind impairment across the two 649 
affective and non-affective psychoses, given the potential for socio-cognitive deficits to impact on 650 
social and occupational function, their comparison remains important, because it may partly explain 651 
differences in outcome between the disorders (Donohoe et al., 2012). For this same reason, reliably 652 
identified differences among diagnoses may be crucial to pinpoint treatment planning, medication 653 
management, and long-term patient care (Thaler et al., 2013). Establishing differences in social 654 
functioning might also be indicative of the likely success of remediation through recent socio-655 
cognitive training schemes that aim to improve abilities such as theory of mind (Brown et al., 656 
2012;Fiszdon and Reddy, 2012;Kurtz and Richardson, 2012;Lahera et al., 2013). It has been 657 
claimed that socio-cognitive impairments such as theory of mind may be less of a determinant of 658 
functioning in bipolar disorder than in schizophrenia, and therefore that non-social cognitive 659 
remediation may be better suited for bipolar disorder (Lee et al., 2013). However, there has been 660 
little direct comparison of the links between theory of mind impairment and social functioning in 661 
the two patient groups. In the study by Caletti et al., patients with bipolar disorder showed greater 662 
social functioning according to the DSM General Assessment of Functioning Scale (American 663 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), level of functioning was then shown to correlate with theory of 664 
mind score, and impairments on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and Faux Pas Test were 665 
worse in schizophrenia than in bipolar disorder (Caletti et al., 2013). It can be inferred from these 666 
data that the impact of theory of mind impairment on functioning that patients with schizophrenia 667 
experience might be greater than that experienced in bipolar disorder, simply because they have a 668 
greater theory of mind deficit. Although the correlations were not examined separately in each 669 
patient group, this was performed in a separate study in which better theory of mind performance 670 
predicted better functioning, but only for the patients with schizophrenia, not for those with bipolar 671 
disorder (Thaler et al., 2014). So, the early signs are that theory of mind impairment does indeed 672 
have more of an impact on everyday functioning in schizophrenia than in bipolar disorder.   673 
 674 
3 Conclusions 675 
This theoretical review has attempted to synthesise the existing data examining the ability of 676 
people with bipolar disorder to deduce the feelings and intentions of other minds via ‘theory of 677 
mind’, and what has been learned from the comparative study vs. the abilities of people with 678 
schizophrenia. In drawing the literature together, a number of themes were identified. in part one 679 
these included the generalisability of impairments across different presentations of bipolar disorder, 680 
changes in impairment according to the type of theory of mind and the task used for assessment, the 681 
influence of cognitive impairment and relationship to illness variables, and the prominent 682 
suggestion of a relationship to history of psychotic symptoms. Then in part two, the prominent 683 
themes included a smaller theory of mind impairment in patients with bipolar disorder vs. 684 
schizophrenia, the relationship to differences in symptoms and cognitive impairments between the 685 
disorders, and the likely consequences of the differences in theory of mind impairment for the 686 
clinical management of patients with bipolar disorders vs. schizophrenia.  687 
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Due to many of the complexities discussed during this theoretical review, our understanding 688 
of theory of mind impairment in bipolar disorder is not yet complete or consolidated, and further 689 
research will be required before our knowledge reaches the advanced state of the literature relating 690 
to schizophrenia. However, currently available data suggest the following trends. First, although 691 
consistent differences in impairment between the mood states remain elusive, there is convincing 692 
evidence that theory of mind is impaired in some way across the mood states, and into the 693 
supposedly asymptomatic state of euthymia. It may therefore be considered a trait rather than state 694 
impairment, i.e. one that is an enduring correlate of bipolar disorder. Given that the structural 695 
neuroanatomical abnormalities associated with bipolar disorder include regions crucial for the 696 
mediation of theory of mind e.g. medial prefrontal cortex (Savitz et al., 2014), this is perhaps not 697 
surprising. Genome-Wide Association Studies have similarly identified an enduring genetic 698 
association between the ZNF804A risk-variant known to increase susceptibility for bipolar disorder 699 
and the phentotype for (ab)normal functional connectivity during theory of mind (Gurung and Prata, 700 
2015). As to methodological generalisation, given that the processing of emotion cues and some of 701 
the common neurocognitive sub-processes e.g. ‘representing mental states with propositional 702 
content’ needed for any form of meta-representation (Schurz and Perner, 2015) are compromised in 703 
patients with bipolar disorder (Townsend and Altshuler, 2012;Van Rheenen and Rossell, 704 
2013a;Atagun et al., 2014;Fung et al., 2015), it is likely that further research with sensitive 705 
methodology will likely demonstrate impairment across both cognitive and affective theory of mind. 706 
We further predict that the possible inter-dependence of impairments in executive functions and 707 
theory of mind will eventually prove fruitful given the strong evidence elsewhere for a deterministic 708 
relationship between the two processes throughout normal development (Devine and Hughes, 709 
2014;Moriguchi, 2014) 710 
Although this review was wide-ranging, it has highlighted a number of pertinent gaps in the field, 711 
and has identified a number of possible future directions. A more comprehensive understanding of 712 
theory of mind impairments in bipolar disorder will be of great clinical utility in devising improved 713 
psychological or cognitive therapies that assist patients with everyday life skills. Whilst early 714 
studies of bipolar disorder have not yet established a clear relationship between these impairments 715 
and functional outcome, it is known from other patient populations that impaired theory of mind is a 716 
crucial factor underlying poor life skills, poor social cognition and some aspects of psychosis. 717 
Based on this wider evidence set, a phenomenon with this potential impact is deserved of further 718 
study. Ultimately, if a lack of relationship between theory of mind impairment and functional 719 
outcome were perpetuated by increasingly sophisticated methods, the question of interest then 720 
becomes what other factor is protecting patients with bipolar disorder against the potential for 721 
theory of mind impairment to compromise functional outcome. As to the question of what should 722 
be done about theory of mind impairments in bipolar disorder, by understanding the cognitive 723 
mechanisms that underlie theory of mind impairment, reformulations as to how to remediate these 724 
skills are facilitated. There is certainly optimism about possible remediation in the literature on 725 
theory of mind in bipolar disorder (Cusi et al., 2012b;Schenkel et al., 2014), just as there has been 726 
for the improvement of theory of mind in schizophrenia. Here, close examination of developments 727 
in the literature on social cognition remediation in schizophrenia will likely be of great inspiration. 728 
Indeed there has already been one successful report of the benefits of a remediation programme 729 
originally developed for use with patients with schizophrenia being transferable to patients with a 730 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder (Lahera et al., 2013). If the neurodevelopmental nature of 731 
schizophrenia and its timing mitigate against acquisition of theory of mind to some degree 732 
(Korkmaz, 2011), the less pronounced neurodevelopmental processes behind adult forms of bipolar 733 
disorder could be taken to indicate an even greater potential for therapeutic success in attempts to 734 
remediate theory of mind impairment in bipolar disorder. Given our increased understanding of the 735 
neurobiological networks involved in theory of mind, neuroimaging research will help elucidate the 736 
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dysfunctional underlying brain mechanisms across the psychoses, and thereby further contribute to 737 
new advances in the treatment of bipolar disorder. 738 
  739 
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Study Sample
1
 Diagnostic 
Criteria 
Participant 
Characteristics 
Medication Details Task
2
 Key Results 
Barrera et 
al. (2013) 
N=12 EUTH 
(7 BP1, 5 
BP2); N=12 
HC 
DSM-IV and 
ICD-10; 
outpatients. 
EUTH: mean age 
48.2 yrs; 100% 
M/0% F. 
HC: mean age 
46.0 yrs; 100% 
M/0% F. 
Mood stabilisers 
(10/12), atypical 
antipsychotics (5/12), 
sedatives (4/12). 
 
The Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test; the Faux 
Pas Recognition Test. 
Trend towards impaired 
cognitive ToM, and trend 
towards association with 
higher number depressive 
episodes.  
Affective ToM not 
impaired. No correlation 
between functionality and 
ToM. 
Benito et 
al (2013) 
N=44 BD (39 
BP1, 6 BP2); 
N=48 HC 
DSM-IV-TR; 
stable 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 
42.3 yrs; 36.4% 
M/ 63.6% F. 
HC: mean age 
45.7 yrs; 37.5% 
M/ 62.5% F. 
Not specified. The Hinting Task. Patients’  verbal ToM 
impaired relative to HC. 
Performance not 
correlated with global 
functioning. 
Bora et al. 
(2005) 
N=43 EUTH 
(BP1); N=30 
HC 
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. out-patients 
not specified. 
EUTH: mean age 
38.6 yrs; 53% M/ 
47% F. 
HC: mean age 
38.9 yrs; 43% M/ 
57% F. 
All patients treated with 
mood stabilisers. 
Atypical antipsychotic 
(6/43); antidepressant 
(2/43); mood stabiliser 
only (28/43); mood 
stabiliser and 
anticonvulsant (9/43); 
mood stabiliser and 
antipsychotic (6/43). 
The Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Task; the Hinting 
Task. 
EUTH impaired on both 
ToM tasks. No effects 
gender or drug treatment, 
clinical variables, nor 
history psychosis. Some 
correlations with 
executive function. 
Cusi et al. 
(2012) 
N=25 BP (17 
BP1, 7 BP2, 1 
BPnos; 10 
EUTH, 12 
DEPsub, 3 
DSM-IV; 
mixed 
inpatients and 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 
45.2 yrs; 28% 
M/72% F. 
HC: mean age 
44.2 yrs; 28% 
Mood stabiliser (11/25); 
anticonvulsant (22/25); 
antidepressants (14/25); 
typical antipsychotics 
(3/25); atypical 
The Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Task. 
BP impaired. Performance 
associated with illness 
duration. Performance not 
associated with social 
functioning. 
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DEPmod); 25 
HC 
M/72% F. antipsychotics (18/25); 
sedatives (22/25); no 
medication (1/25). 
Inoue et 
al. (2004) 
N=50 AFF 
euth (34 
MDD; 16 
BP); N=50 
HC 
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. out-patients 
not specified. 
EUTH: mean age 
44.5 yrs; 56% M/ 
44% F. 
HC: mean age 
38.9 yrs; 56% M/ 
44% F. 
All patients receiving 
medication. 
Antidepressants 
(49/50); typical 
antipsychotic (6/50); 
atypical antipsychotic 
(4/50). 
Custom-made picture 
sequencing task using 
caricatures and verbal 
descriptions, followed by 
first- and second-order 
ToM questions. 
AFF impaired on second-
order ToM only. No 
correlations with IQ. 
Ioannidi et 
al. (2015) 
N=29 BP1 (in 
both a 
symptomatic 
and euthymic 
phase); N=29 
HC  
DSM-IV-TR; 
in- vs. out-
patients not 
specified. 
BP1: mean age 
44.2 yrs; 41.4% 
M/58.6% F. 
HC: mean age 
44.9 yrs; 41.4% 
M/58.6% F. 
All patients receiving 
mood stabilisers. 
Majority also received 
antipsychotics, 
antidepressants or 
benzodiazepines. 
Two stories examined 
ability to appreciate first-
order false beliefs; the 
Hinting Task; the Faux Pas 
recognition task. 
Significantly lower 
performance in all ToM 
tests during acute phases 
vs. HC. Only impaired on 
Faux Pas test in euthymic 
phase. Faux Pas test 
impairments not 
significant when 
neuropsychological 
performance accounted 
for. 
Kerr et al. 
(2003) 
N=20 MAN; 
N=15 DEP; 
N=13 EUTH; 
N=15 HC 
DSM-IV; 
mixed 
inpatients and 
outpatients. 
MAN: mean age 
41.3 yrs; 55% 
M/45% F. 
DEP: mean age 
45.1 yrs; 52.5% 
M/47.5% F. 
EUTH: mean age 
46.8 yrs; 46.7% 
M/53.3% F. 
HC: mean age 
36.0 yrs; 46.7% 
Mood stabiliser (47/48-
collapsed across 
groups). 
MAN: antipsychotics 
(20/20); antidepressants 
(1/20); anticonvulsants 
(5/20). 
DEP: antipsychotics 
(7/15), antidepressants 
(4/15); anticonvulsants 
(3/15). 
Six stories examined 
ability to appreciate first- 
and second-order false 
beliefs and deceptions. 
Stories read aloud with 
concurrent presentation 
cartoon drawings depicting 
action sequences. 
Impaired 1
st
 and 2
nd
 order 
ToM performance for 
DEP and MAN even when 
memory controlled for. 
MAN performance worse 
than DEP. EUTH not 
impaired. 
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M/53.3% F. EUTH: antipsychotics 
(4/13), antidepressants 
(1/13); anticonvulsants 
(1/13). 
Lahera et 
al. (2008) 
N=42 EUTH 
with 
psychosis; 
N=33 EUTH 
without 
Psychosis; 
N=48 HC. 
DSM-IV-TR; 
stable 
outpatients. 
EUTH with 
psychosis: mean 
age 45.8 yrs; 
33.3% M/66.7% 
F. 
EUTH without 
psychosis: mean 
age 51.2 yrs; 
48.5% M/51.5% 
F. 
HC: mean age 
46.6 yrs; 33.3% 
M/ 66.7% F. 
No between-group 
differences in mean 
number drugs received. 
Regarding type, EUTH 
with psychosis received 
mood stabiliser and 
antipsychotic 
combination with 
higher frequency than 
EUTH without. 
Patients without 
psychosis on mood 
stabilisers with higher 
frequency than EUTH 
with psychosis. 
The Strange Stories Task. Performance similar in 
bipolar patients with or 
without psychosis. Both 
impaired relative to HC. 
Impairments partly 
explained by general 
cognitive deficit. 
Martino et 
al. (2011) 
N=45 BP1; 
N=36 BP2; 
N=34 HC. 
DSM-IV; 
outpatients. 
BP1: mean age 
37.2 yrs; 44.5% 
M/55.5% F. 
BP2: mean age 
42.9 yrs; 22.3% 
M; 77.7% F. 
HC: mean age 
39.7 yrs; 35.3% 
M/64.7% F. 
All patients receiving 
mood stabilisers. 
Additionally 36% were 
receiving 
antidepressants, 48% 
benzodiazepines, and 
54% antipsychotics. BP 
had higher exposure to 
antipsychotics than 
BP2. No differences 
between BP1 and BP2 
in exposure to other 
psychotropic 
The Faux Pas test; the 
Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task. 
Both BP1 and BP2 
impaired relative to HC. 
When neurocognitive 
impairments and exposure 
to medications controlled, 
performance did not 
predict whether patient or 
HC. Impaired ToM partly 
mediated by executive 
function deficits and 
exposure to psychotropic 
medications.  
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medications.  
BP1 had higher dose 
antipsychotics BP2.  
McKinnon 
et al. 
(2010) 
N=14 BPsub 
(8 BP1, 5 
BP2, 1 
BPnos); N=14 
HC 
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. out-patients 
not specified. 
BPsub: mean age 
47.5 yrs; 28.6% 
M/71.4% F. 
HC: mean age 
43.1 yrs; 35.7% 
M/64.3% F. 
All patients receiving 
medication. Mood 
stabiliser (7/14); 
anticonvulsants (6/14); 
antipsychotics (8/14); 
antidepressants (7/14); 
sedatives (10/14); 
stimulant (1/14). 
Custom-made test with 
scenarios describing 
complex social situations 
such as faux pas, followed 
by first- and second-order 
ToM questions. 
Patients impaired on 
cognitively demanding 
second-order ToM . 
Reduced performance 
associated with longer 
illness duration, and 
increased symptom 
severity. 
Montag et 
al (2010) 
N=29 EUTH; 
N=29 HC 
DSM-IV; 
outpatients. 
EUTH: mean age 
44.0 yrs; 34.5% 
M/65.5% F. 
HC: mean age 
39.7 yrs; 44.8% 
M/55.2% F. 
All patients receiving 
medication. Mood 
stabiliser (9/29); 
anticonvulsant (17/29); 
atypical antipsychotic 
(13/29); antidepressant 
(11/29); sedatives 
(2/29). 
The Movie for the 
Assessment of Social 
Cognition 
EUTH performed worse 
than HC for cognitive 
ToM, but not for affective 
ToM. EUTH showed 
higher ‘undermentalising’ 
but not higher 
‘overmentalising’. 
Number manic episodes 
correlated with 
‘undermentalising’ and 
affective ToM. 
Olley et al. 
(2005) 
N=15 EUTH 
(BP1); N=13 
HC 
DSM-IV; 
outpatients. 
EUTH: mean age 
39.2 yrs; 46.7% 
M/53.3% F. 
HC: mean age 
40.8 yrs; 46.1% 
M/53.9% F. 
Stable medication 
regime for 6 weeks. 
Number of 
Years’ exposure to 
psychotropic 
medications recorded 
but not reported. 
Medication effects not 
examined due to 
different combinations 
The Strange Stories Task. 
Also a custom-made 
cartoon comprehension 
task that required ToM to 
interpret correctly. 
Impaired relative to HC 
on verbal ToM. Although 
performance comparable 
to HC for non-verbal 
ToM, responses slower. 
ToM did not correlate 
with social or 
occupational functioning, 
but some correlations with 
executive function. 
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mood stabilisers, 
antidepressants, and 
antipsychotics. 
 
 
Purcell et 
al. (2013) 
N=29 EUTH; 
N=28 HC 
DSM-IV-TR; 
outpatients. 
EUTH: mean age 
29.6 yrs; 35% 
M/65% F. 
HC: mean age 
32.1 yrs; 36% 
M/63% F. 
Mean number of 
psychotropic 
medications currently 
taken, including 
anticonvulsants, mood 
stabilisers, 
antipsychotics, 
stimulants, 
antidepressants, and 
sedatives = 2.04. 
The Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Task. 
EUTH responded faster in 
comparison to HC. 
Performance accuracy no 
different though. Faster 
response times predicted 
increased overall life 
functioning impairment. 
Reynolds 
et al. 
(2014) 
N=20 BD; 
N=20 HC 
NB, first-
degree relatives 
of patients with 
specified DSM-
IV-TR 
diagnosis. 
NB, children of 
mothers with 
specified DSM-
IV diagnosis. 
 
NA The Strange Stories Task; 
the Picture Sequencing 
Task; the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Task. 
BP impaired on verbal 
ToM, but not visual or 
higher-order ToM tasks. 
Schenkel 
et al. 
(2008) 
N=26 BD; 
N=20 HC 
DSM-IV; 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 
13.2 yrs; 62% 
M/38% F. 
HC: mean age 
13.0 yrs; 55% 
M/45% F. 
Medication-free at least 
1 week prior to testing. 
Custom-made measure 
false-belief understanding 
(‘Affective Story Task’). 
Stories of emotionally-
charged situations read 
aloud, participants asked 
false-belief question to 
assess whether understood 
potential for 
misunderstanding. 
The Hinting Task. 
BP impaired relative to 
HC in positive and 
negative conditions of 
Affective Story Task. BP 
also worse than HC on 
Hinting Task. 
Performance associated 
with younger age, earlier 
illness onset and manic 
symptoms. 
Schenkel 
et al. 
N=17 BP1; 
N=8 BP2; 
DSM-IV; 
outpatients. 
BP1: mean age 
11.4 yrs; 58.8% 
Majority patients 
medicated but receiving 
The Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Task; the 
BD1 worse than HC on 
Reading Mind in the Eyes 
Prov
isio
al
Running Title: BIPOLAR DISORDER - THEORY OF MIND     31 
_____________________________________________________________ 
        
 
(2014) N=25 HC M/41.2% F. 
BP2: mean age 
13.4 yrs; 100% 
M/0% F. 
HC: mean age 
12.4 yrs; 64% 
M/36% F. 
different classes 
medications (atypical 
antipsychotics, mood 
stabilisers, or both). 
Cognitive and Emotional 
Perspective Taking Task. 
Task, and cognitive (but 
not emotional) condition 
of Cognitive and 
Emotional Perspective-
Taking Task. 
Shamay-
Tsoory et 
al. (2009) 
N=19 EUTH 
(BP1); N=20 
HC. 
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. out-patients. 
EUTH: mean age 
40.2 yrs; 52.6% 
M/47.4% F. 
HC: mean age 
32.6 yrs; 55% 
M/45% F. 
All patients receiving 
medication (mainly 
mood stabilisers), 
medication intake stable 
during preceding 
month.  
 
The Social Stories Test. Impaired cognitive ToM, 
but not affective ToM. 
Performance not related to 
performance of 
neurocognitive tests. 
Mood stabilising sub-
groups had no effect on 
ToM. 
Terrien et 
al. (2014) 
N=316 HC Hypomanic 
Personality 
Scale; Beck 
Depression 
Inventory. 
HC: mean age 
23.3 yrs; 20.9% 
M/79.1% F. 
NA The Yoni task. Males: Mood vitality and 
excitement sub-scale 
predicted performance. 
Females: No sub-scales 
predicted performance. 
Van 
Rheenen 
& Rossell 
(2013) 
N=49 BP (16 
DEP, 4 MAN, 
12 MIX, 17 
EUTH; 37 
BD1, 12 
BD2); N=48 
HC 
 
DSM-IV-TR; 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 
38.5 yrs; 48.5% 
M/51.5% F. 
HC: mean age 
34.7 yrs; 58.1% 
M/41.9% F. 
Antipsychotics (31/49); 
antidepressants (15/49); 
mood stabilisers 
(16/49); sedatives 
(10/49). 
The Picture Sequencing 
Task. 
BP performed worse than 
HC for ToM-relevant 
false-belief stories, but not 
on control stories. No 
differences in 
performance of 
symptomatic vs. euthymic 
patients, or BD1 vs. BD2.  
Van 
Rheenen et 
al. (2014) 
N=51 BP; 
N=52 HC 
DSM-IV-TR; 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 
38.5 yrs; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F. 
HC: mean age 
Antipsychotics (33/51); 
antidepressants (16/51); 
mood stabilisers 
(16/51); sedatives 
The Picture Sequencing 
Task. 
Neurocognition associated 
with ToM, but social 
cognition not associated 
with emotion regulation.  
Prov
i io
al
Running Title: BIPOLAR DISORDER - THEORY OF MIND     32 
_____________________________________________________________ 
        
 
34.0 yrs; 38.5% 
M/61.5% F. 
(10/51). 
 
 
Whitney et 
al. (2013) 
N=24 BP; 
N=27 HC 
NB, children of 
mothers with 
specified DSM-
IV diagnosis. 
Evidence of 
mood 
dysregulation, 
but not fully 
syndromal BP. 
BP: mean age 
12.7 yrs; 54% 
M/46% F. 
HC: mean age 
13.3 yrs; 40% 
M/60% F. 
68% lifetime exposure 
to psychotropic 
medications. 
ToM subtest of NEPSY II 
(developmental 
NEuroPSYchological 
assessment). 
No differences between 
BP and HC. 
Wolf et al. 
(2010) 
N=33 BP (12 
DEP, 10 
MAN, 11 
EUTH); N=29 
HC. 
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. out-patients 
not specified. 
BP: mean age 
47.7 yrs; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F. 
HC: mean age 
37.0 yrs; 34.5% 
M/65.5% F. 
Mood stabilisers 
(18/33), atypical 
antipsychotics (28/33), 
antidepressants (15/33). 
Comic-strip task based in 
part on the Picture 
Sequencing Task, in which 
participants sequence 
cartoon stories and asked 
questions about characters’ 
mental states. 
BP and all clinical sub-
groups 
impaired on all measures, 
but did not differ from 
each other in most ToM 
scores. Poorer 
performance on executive 
tasks did not fully explain 
impairments. 
Table 1. Overview of theory of mind research in studies assessing patients with bipolar disorder without direct comparison to patients with 1050 
schizophrenia. 1051 
 AFF = affective disorder; BP = bipolar disorder; BP1 = bipolar I disorder; BP2 = bipolar II disorder; BPnos = bipolar disorder not 1052 
otherwise specified, BPsub = sub-syndromal bipolar disorder; DEP = depressed bipolar patients, DEPsub = sub-syndromal depression; 1053 
DEPmod = moderate depression; EUTH = euthymic bipolar patients; HC = healthy adult controls, MDD = major depressive disorder; MAN 1054 
= manic bipolar patients; MIX = bipolar patients showing signs of both mania and depression.  1055 
1 
Patient groups outside of the bipolar disorders not included. 1056 
2
 Non-theory of mind tasks not included. 1057 
Prov
ision
a
Running Title: BIPOLAR DISORDER - THEORY OF MIND     33 
_____________________________________________________________ 
        
 
Study Sample
1
 Diagnostic 
Criteria 
Participant 
Characteristics 
Details of Medication 
Supplied 
ToM Task
2
 Key Results 
Bazin et 
al. (2009) 
N=15 MAN; N=12 
DEP; N=15 SCHIZ; 
N=12 HC. 
DSM-IV; 
stable 
outpatients. 
MAN: mean age 
36.1 yrs; 86.7% 
M/13.3% F. 
DEP: mean age 
46.7 yrs; 50% 
M/50% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
35.4 yrs; 12M/3F. 
HC: mean age 30.1 
yrs; 5M/10F. 
MAN/DEP: mood stabilisers, 
antipsychotics and/or 
antidepressants. 
SCHIZ: antipsychotics. 
 
The Versailles-
Situational 
Intention 
Reading task (V-
SIR): Video 
excerpts 
depicting 
complex real-life 
scenes social 
interactions. 
Also non-verbal 
comic-strip task 
(see Sarfati entry 
below). 
MAN impaired relative 
to HC. Performance of 
MAN and DEP not 
distinguishable. Trend 
towards SCHIZ 
performing worse than 
MAN. No effect of group 
for comic-strip task. 
Caletti et 
al. (2013) 
N=18 EUTH (10 
BP1, 8 BP2); N=30 
SCHIZ; N=18 HC. 
DSM-IV-TR; 
outpatients.  
EUTH: mean age 
42.2 yrs; 22.2% 
M/77.8% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
42.5; 80% M/20% 
F. 
HC: mean age 36.1; 
33.3% M/66.7% F. 
EUTH: atypical antipsychotic 
(16/18); typical antipsychotic 
(3/18); mood stabiliser (18/18); 
antidepressant (8/18); sedative 
(5/18). 
SCHIZ: atypical antipsychotic 
(19/30); typical antipsychotic 
(11/30); Mood stabiliser (4/30); 
antidepressant (2/30); sedative 
(8/30). 
The Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes 
Task; the Faux 
Pas test.  
Both SCHIZ and EUTH 
performed worse than 
HC. SCHIZ performed 
worse than EUTH in 
both tasks. 
Donohoe 
et al. 
(2012) 
N=132 BP; N=208 
SCHIZ; N=132 HC.  
DSM-IV; 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 44.8 
yrs; 54.5% 
M/45.5% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
41.1 yrs; 72.3% 
M/27.7% F. 
HC: mean age 37.5 
BP: 269.8 mg chlorpromazine 
equivalents. 
SCHIZ: 555.9mg 
chlorpromazine equivalents. 
The Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes 
Task; the Hinting 
Task. 
BP impaired on Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes 
Task; performance 
comparable to SCHIZ. 
More subtle impairment 
in BP relative to SCHIZ 
for Hinting Task. 
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yrs; 39.9% 
M/60.1% F. 
Doody et 
al. (1998) 
N=12 AFF (10 
MDD/2 DEP); N=28 
SCHIZ. 
No HC. 
DSM-III-R.  
BP: 
inpatients; 
SCHIZ 
outpatients. 
AFF: mean age 42.3 
yrs, 8.3% M/91.7% 
F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
46.3 yrs; 60.7% 
M/39.3% F. 
HC: mean age 20.4 
yrs; 45% M/55% F. 
Not specified. The Sally-Anne 
Task (first-order 
ToM); the Ice-
Cream Van Test 
(second-order 
ToM). 
Both SCHIZ and AFF 
performed Sally-Anne 
Task normally. SCHIZ 
impaired on Ice-Cream 
Van Test, but not AFF. 
Guastella 
et al. 
(2013) 
N=40 BP; N=23 
SCHIZ/FEP/SAD. 
No HC. 
DSM-IV-TR; 
stable 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 21.7 
yrs; 27% M/73% F. 
SCHIZ/FEP/SAD: 
mean age 22.8 yrs; 
83% M/17% F. 
BP: antipsychotic (24/40); 
antidepressant (24/40); mood 
stabiliser (16/40). 
SCHIZ/FEP/SAD: antipsychotic 
(20/23); antidepressant (3/23); 
mood stabiliser (1/23). 
The Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes 
Task. 
SCHIZ/FEP/SAD more 
impaired than BP. Across 
diagnostic groups, 
performance correlated 
with psychotic but not 
affective symptoms. 
Lahera et 
al. (2015) 
N=46 BP; N=49 
SCHIZ; N=50 HC. 
DSM-IV-TR; 
stable 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 38.6 
yrs; 37% M/63% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
40.4 yrs; 57.1% 
M/42.9% F. 
HC: mean age 43.3 
yrs; 42% M/58% F. 
BP and SCHIZ: receiving 
unspecified pharmacological 
treatment. 
The Hinting 
Task. 
SCHIZ performed worse 
than BP and HC. BP also 
worse than HC. 
Lee et al. 
(2013) 
N=68 BP (52 EUTH); 
N=38 SCHIZ; 
N=HC. 
DSM-IV; 
stable 
outpatients. 
BP: mean age 43.9 
yrs; 54.4% 
M/45.6% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
44.7 yrs; 55.3% 
M/44.7% F. 
HC: mean age 41.4 
yrs; 55.6% 
M/44.4% F. 
BP: Antipsychotic (41/68); 
Lithium (13/68). 
SCHIZ: Antipsychotic (38/38). 
The Awareness 
of Social 
Inference Test. 
On lie and sarcasm 
subscales, BP not 
impaired relative to HC, 
but SCHIZ performed 
better than BP and 
SCHIZ. 
 
Marjoram N=15 AFF (7 BP, 8 DSM-IV; AFF: mean age 41.7 AFF: Antidepressant only The Hinting BP not impaired relative 
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et al. 
(2005) 
MDD); N=15 
SCHIZ; N=15 HC. 
mixed 
inpatients and 
outpatients. 
yrs; 40% M/60% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
28.3 yrs; 86.7% 
M/13.3% F. 
HC: mean age 34.3 
yrs; 66.7% 
M/33.3% F. 
(9/15); Antidepressant and 
typical antipsychotic (5/15); 
antidepressant and atypical 
antipsychotic (1/15). 
SCHIZ: Typical antipsychotic 
only (4/15); typical 
antipsychotic and 
anticholinergic (5/15); atypical 
antipsychotic only (5/15); 
atypical antipsychotic and 
anticholinergic. 
Task. to HC. SCHIZ worse 
than HC and AFF. 
Across diagnostic 
groups, performance 
correlated with psychotic 
(delusions and 
hallucinations) but not 
negative symptoms. 
Maróthi & 
Kéri 
(2014) 
N=23 BP; N=28 
SCHIZ; N=29 HC. 
NB, children 
of mothers 
with specified 
DSM-IV 
diagnosis. 
 
BP: mean age 10.8 
yrs; 78.3% 
M/21.7% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
10.6 yrs; 71.4% 
M/28.5% F.  
HC: mean age 10.6 
yrs; 55.2% 
M/44.8% F. 
N/A The Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes 
Task. 
SCHIZ impaired, but BP 
no different to HC. 
Pawlby et 
al. (2010) 
N=23 DEP; N=12 
MAN; N=15 SCHIZ; 
N=49 HC. 
DSM-IV; 
inpatients on 
mother and 
baby unit. 
DEP: mean age 
32.2 yrs; 100% F. 
MAN: mean age 
29.0 yrs; 100% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
30.5 yrs; 100% F. 
HC: mean age 30.5 
yrs; 100% F. 
Not specified, but mothers 
undergoing current treatment 
for a psychiatric condition 
excluded. 
5-min video 
recordings of 
unstructured play 
session with 
baby coded. 
Relative to HD, DEP less 
likely to comment on 
baby’s mental state. 
SCHIZ interactional 
behaviour no different to 
HC. 
Rossell & 
Van 
Rheenen 
(2013) 
N=28 MAN; N=30 
SCHIZ; N=29 HC.  
DSM-IV; 
mixed 
inpatients and 
outpatients. 
MAN: mean age 
38.3 yrs; 40% 
M/60% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
36.5 yrs; 63.3% 
MAN: mood stabiliser (5/28); 
atypical antipsychotic (5/28); 
typical antipsychotic (1/28); 
mood stabiliser and atypical 
antipsychotic (8/28); mood 
The Strange 
Stories Task. 
Both patient groups 
equally impaired. 
Reduced ToM 
performance correlated 
with delusion severity in 
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M/36.7% F. 
HC: mean age 35.9 
yrs; 65.5% 
M/34.5% F. 
stabiliser and antidepressant 
(4/28); typical antipsychotic and 
atypical antipsychotic and 
anticonvulsant (1/28); atypical 
antipsychotic and antidepressant 
(1/28); anticonvulsant and 
antidepressant (1/28); no 
medication (3/28). 
SCHIZ: atypical antipsychotics 
(21/30); typical antipsychotics 
(7/30); no medication (2/30). 
MAN only. 
Rowland 
et al. 
(2013) 
N=33 BP1; N=56 
SCHIZ; N=58 HC. 
DSM-IV; 
outpatients. 
BP1: mean age 40.7 
yrs; 54.3% 
M/45.7% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
44.6 yrs; 57.1% M/ 
42.9% F. 
HC: mean age 
33.9%; 50% 
M/50% F. 
BP1: antipsychotic (2/33); 
mood stabiliser (7/33); 
antipsychotic and mood 
stabiliser (10/33); antidepressant 
and mood stabiliser (7/33); 
antipsychotic and antidepressant 
and mood stabiliser (2/33). 
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (18/56); 
antipsychotic and antidepressant 
(18/56); antipsychotic and mood 
stabiliser (5/56); antipsychotic 
and antidepressant and mood 
stabiliser (7/56). 
The Awareness 
of Social 
Inference Test. 
Both BP1 and SCHIZ 
impaired, SCHIZ worse 
than BP1. 
Sarfati & 
Hardy-
Baylé 
(1999) 
N=10 MAN; N=15 
SCHIZ with 
disorganisation; 
N=10 SCHIZ without 
disorganisation; 
N=15 HC. 
DSM-IV; 
inpatients.  
MAN: mean age 
33.9 yrs; 60% 
M/40% F. 
SCHIZdis: mean 
age 35.7 yrs; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F. 
SCHIZnodis: mean 
age 29.2 yrs; 20% 
M/80% F. 
MAN: antipsychotic (9/10). 
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (24/25). 
No difference in dose between 
groups.  
 
Custom-made 
comic strip task; 
participants 
select card (from 
four) most likely 
to be last cartoon 
drawing. 
No impairments in 
MAN. SCHIZ with 
disorganisation 
performed worst. 
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HC: mean age 28.6 
yrs; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F. 
Thaler et 
al. (2013) 
N=24 BP1 with 
psychosis; N=24 BP1 
without psychosis; 
N=30 SCHIZ; N=24 
HC. 
DSM-IV; 
stable 
patients, but 
inpatients vs. 
outpatients 
not specified. 
BP1 with psychosis: 
mean age 37.6 yrs; 
25%M/75% F. 
BP1 without 
psychosis: mean 
age 34.1 yrs; 42% 
M/58% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
47.9 yrs; 66% 
M/33% F. 
HC: mean age 36.1 
yrs; 46% M/54% F. 
BP1 with psychosis: 
antipsychotic (14/24); 
anticonvulsant (13/24); 
antidepressant (10/24); mood 
stabiliser (5/24). 
BP1 without psychosis: 
antipsychotic (8/24); 
anticonvulsant (8/24); 
antidepressant (10/24); mood 
stabiliser (2/24). 
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (29/30); 
anticonvulsant (19/30); 
antidepressant (13/30); mood 
stabiliser (2/30). 
The Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes 
Task; the Hinting 
Task. 
All clinical groups 
performed worse than 
HC, but at similar level 
to one another. 
Thaler et 
al. (2014) 
N=24 BP with 
psychosis; N=24 BP 
without psychosis; 
N=30 SCHIZ. 
No HC. 
DSM-IV; 
stable 
patients, but 
inpatients vs. 
outpatients 
not specified. 
BP1 with psychosis: 
mean age 37.6 yrs; 
25%M/75% F. 
BP1 without 
psychosis: mean 
age 34.1 yrs; 42% 
M/58% F. 
SCHIZ: mean age 
47.9 yrs; 66% 
M/33% F. 
BP with psychosis: 
antipsychotic (8/24); 
anticonvulsant (8/24); 
antidepressant (10/24); mood 
stabiliser (2/24). 
BP without psychosis: 
antipsychotic (14/24); 
anticonvulsant (13/24); 
antidepressant (10/24); mood 
stabiliser (5/24). 
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (29/30); 
anticonvulsant (19/30); 
antidepressant (13/30); mood 
stabiliser (2/30). 
The Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes 
Task; the Hinting 
Task. 
ToM only predicted 
functional capacity for 
SCHIZ. 
Table 2. Overview of theory of mind research in studies assessing patients with bipolar disorder with direct comparison to patients with schizophrenia*. 
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 AFF = affective disorder; BP = bipolar disorder; BP1 = bipolar I disorder; BP2 = bipolar II disorder; DEP = depressed bipolar patients, DYS = 
Dysthymia; EUTH = euthymic bipolar patients; FEP = First-episode Psychosis; HC = healthy adult controls, MAN = manic bipolar patients, SAD = 
Schizoaffective Disorder; SCHIZ = patients with schizophrenia.  
1 
Patient groups outside of the bipolar disorders and the psychoses not included. 
2
 Non-theory of mind tasks not included. 
 
Prov
ision
al
